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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it 
denied the defendant's motion for change of venue? 
II. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it 
admitted photographs of the homicide victims which were unduly 
prejudicial and not probative of essential facts? 
III. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress his confession? 
IV. Do Utah's sentencing proceedings for capital felony 
cases violate due process when the statutory aggravating factors, 
which are necessary elements of the capital crime, are also the 
aggravating factors considered by the jury in determining whether 
to impose the death sentence? 
V. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it 
instructed the jury that it could consider any evidence which 
had been admitted in the guilt portion of the trial, in addition 
to the evidence admitted in the penalty portion? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Douglas Carter was charged with the commission 
of a capital felony involving the death of Eva Oleson, the aunt of 
Provo Police Chief Swen Nielsen. The homicide was alleged to have 
occurred on the 27th of February, 1985. 
On June 11, 1985, Sergeant Cunningham arrested the defendant at 
the apartment of Ms. JoAnne Robins. Ms. Robins had befriended the 
defendant and provided him with a place to stay. Ms. Robins had 
three children, ages 8, 9 and 13. (R. 312). Upon his arrest, the 
defendant was concerned with what would happen to his girl friend, 
Ms. Robins. (R. 280, 314-8). The defendant asked about her five 
or six times during each of the two five-hour long interrogation 
sessions. (R. 281, 317). The police officers testified that they 
informed the defendant that she was arrested for harboring a 
fugitive. (R. 257). The defendant knew the statement was true 
because he had seen Ms. Robins in the jail holding area. The 
defendant testified that the officers promised if he would 
confess, they would release Ms. Robins. (R. 314, 320). He states 
that every time he raised the issue of Ms. Robins1 status, they 
told him that she was arrested and would be going to prison. On 
one occasion, they told him that her children would be placed in 
foster care. (R. 314, 318). 
The preliminary hearing was held on the 25th of June, 1985 at 
which the defendant was represented by E. Duke McNeil, attorney at 
law. Defendant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District 
Court for arraignment. 
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On July 26, 1985, defendant was arraigned before Judge Cullen 
Y. Christensen, at which time the defendant entered a plea of not 
guilty. The case was assigned to Judge Cullen Y. Christensen for 
trial to begin on October 3/ 1985. Trial was rescheduled to 
begin December 12, 1985 at 9:30 a.m. upon the request of counsel 
for the defendant. 
On the 29th day of November, 1985, the defendant, through 
counsel, filed a Motion to Suppress Statements together with 
supporting Memorandum of Law and supporting Affidavits. Further, 
the defendant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Insanity Defense 
or in the Alternative the Defense of Diminished Mental Capacity 
and a Motion for Change of Venue. Said motions were likewise 
filed on November 29, 1985. The motions were scheduled for 
hearing on December 9, 1985. 
On December 9, 1985, counsel for the parties and the parties 
appeared and the trial court heard evidence on defendant's Motion 
to Supress and Motion for Change of Venue. The motions were 
taken under advisement by the court. On December 10, 1985, 
additional evidence was submitted by counsel for the defendant 
pertaining to the Motion for Change of Venue, whereupon the Court 
denied the Motion for Change of Venue and also denied the Motion to 
Suppress (R. 63). On the 11th day of December, 1985 counsel for 
the defendant moved the court to allow for the withdrawal of his 
Notice of Insanity Defense and Diminished Mental Capacity. The 
court heard argument on said motion and allowed defendant to 
withdraw his Notice of Insanity Defense and Diminished Mental 
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Capacity (R. 65) . 
The trial began on December 12, 1985 with voir dire 
examination of the jurors and ended on December 19, 1985 with the 
jury's decision that the defendant should receive the death 
penalty. 
Jury qualification began on December 12, 1985 and continued 
until December 13, 1985 in the evening. During this two-day 
process, 47 jurors were questioned relative to their knowledge 
regarding the case, their backgrounds, whether they had formed an 
opinion regarding the case, and their feelings about the death 
penalty (R. 498-1006). At the end of this procedure, 30 jurors 
were qualified, from which a jury of 12 was selected. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court committed prejudicial error by failing to grant a 
change of venue. In view of the unusually concentrated and 
regionally publicized nature of this case, this failure to change 
venue resulted in a panel of jurors who were more than casually 
informed of the case. 
The trial court committed error in allowing admission of 
photographs of the victim which were unduly prejudicial, 
inflammatory and not probative of essential facts. The chance 
that the jury would base its decision out of passion was 
enhanced by such evidence. The photos were not necessary to 
establish any facts, and were cumlative of the other competent 
evidence introduced. 
The trial court committed error by failing to grant 
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defendant's Motion to Suppress. The defendant's confession was 
not voluntary, but was induced by police officers who led 
defendant to believe that he must confess to the crime under 
investigation or an innocent girl friend and her children would 
suffer. 
Utah's statutory scheme, in which the statutory aggravating 
factors, also elements of the capital crime, are the 
aggravating factors considered by the jury in determining whether 
to impose the death penalty, violates due process. The jurors 
who have convicted the defendant have already found beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating factors during the guilt phase. 
They are then instructed that they must find aggravating factors 
in the penalty phase and apply the same reasonable doubt standard. 
The jurors are already predisposed toward death because finding 
that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors be-
yond a reasonable doubt requires some mental gymnastics that are 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a layperson to do. 
Reasonable minds could not have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors completely 
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the imposition of the death penalty was justified and 
appropriate under the circumstances. There was substantial 
evidence of mitigation and little evidence of aggravation, other 
than the actual commission of the crime. 
The court erred in allowing the jury to consider any evidence 
which had been admitted during the guilt phase of the trial in 
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considering the penalty to be imposed. Such procedure is not 
susceptible to meaningful review, in that the reviewing court 
cannot determine the validity of the factors which were considered 
by the jury in arriving at their determination to impose the death 
sentence. It is, therefore, constitutionally infirm that the 
death penalty may be imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory 
manner. Such procedure is further prejudicial in that there may 
be evidence introduced during the guilt phase which is competent 
for a limited purpose, but which is not competent evidence if 
offered in the penalty phase. 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF 
VENUE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Utah Constitution provides that, in criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall have the right to a trial "by an impartial 
jury...11 Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-29(e) (198C as amended) deals with the 
bases that may be employed by a defendant to request a change of 
venue. That subsection, also known as Rule 29 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows: 
If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal 
action believes that a fair and impartial trial 
cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action 
is pending, either may, by motion, supported by an 
affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the 
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdic-
tion. 
If the court is satisfied that the representations 
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of 
the case, the court shall enter an order for the 
removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction 
free from such objection and all records pertaining to 
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the case shall be transferred forthwith in such another 
county. 
In addressing the issue of pretrial publicity/ the Court in 
State v. Wood, Utah, 638 P.2d 71, 88 (1982) , established that the 
defendant has the burden of proving that a "fair and impartial 
trial cannot be held in the county where the action is pending." 
It is generally accepted that the defendant must show a 
reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of relief such as a 
change of venue, a fair trial cannot be had. It is also generally 
understood that a reasonable likelihood of prejudice does not mean 
that prejudice must be more probable than not. Fraizer v. 
Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 
694 (1971); People v. Welch, 104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225 
(1972); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221 (Ak. 1979). 
The most recent Utah case addressing the pretrial publicity 
issue is Codianna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101 (1983). In 
Codianna the Court recognized that: 
An accused can be denied a fair trial where the 
process of news gathering has allowed such a free 
reign that it intrudes into every aspect of a trial 
and creates a "carnival atmosphere" and where the 
publicity is so weighted against the defendant and 
so extreme in its impact that members of the jury 
are encouraged to form strong preconceived views 
of his guilt. Id_. at 1111; Shepherd v. Maxwell, 
384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1519, 16 L.Ed 2d 
600 (1966). 
Although other murder trials in Utah have received even more 
notoriety and press attention, the attention given this case was 
particularly prejudicial to the client. In his arguments to the 
trial court regarding a change of venue, defendant's attorney 
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expressed three major reasons justifying an order for a change of 
venue: (a) the murder victim was the aunt of the Provo City Chief 
of Police, Swen Neilsen; (b) the defendant was black; and (c) the 
trial was being held in Provo, a community which is predominantly 
white and Mormon (R. 357-397, 403-407). These three factors 
subjected the defendant to a three-fold threat of prejudice. 
Swen Neilsen, the Provo City Chief of Police, testified that 
he conducted a press conference on February 28, 1985, the day 
after the murder of his aunt occurred (R. 368) . He indicated 
that media from Utah County and other adjoining counties, 
including newspapers, radio and television, were present at that 
press conference (R. 369). Subsequently, he was also 
interviewed individually by stations from Salt Lake City (R. 
369). Throughout all media coverage, including television 
coverage at the scene of the night of the incident, the media 
clearly announced his position in the community as police chief 
and his family relationship to Mrs. Oleson (R. 369). 
Since the chief of police in any city represents one of the 
highest offices in that jurisdiction, public notice naturally 
attaches as soon as any relative of that official dies at the 
hands of another person. It is easy to see that there exists, in 
any case such as the instant case, a reasonable likelihood of 
prejudice against the defendant who is charged with such a murder. 
The attendant publicity in this case certainly created an 
atmosphere in Utah County and the city of Provo which denied the 
defendant an impartial jury and a fair trial. 
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Defense counsel also pointed out to the court the 
impossibility of obtaining an impartial jury and a fair trial in a 
community such as Provo where black people make up less than 
two percent of the population and where the predominant religion 
(Mormonism) has had a history of some apparent discrimination 
(R. 406). As defense counsel stated, 
We must deal with facts as facts are. The defendant 
is a black man, he is a black man on trial for the 
death of a white woman. To add, in addition to that, he 
comes into court with a big, black lawyer from Chicago 
(R. 407). 
It is clear that these three factors combined deprived the 
defendant of an impartial, unprejudiced jury and a fair trial. He 
was a black man in an almost totally white and Mormon community 
accused of murdering the aunt of a well-known public official. 
The case had acquired substantial notoriety in the local and 
statewide media, including newspapers, television and radio. The 
trial court certainly abused its discretion when it denied the 
defendant's motion for a change of venue. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HOMICIDE VICTIM WHICH WERE UNDULY 
PREJUDICIAL AND NOT PROBATIVE OF ESSENTIAL FACTS. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Fules of Evidence allows for the 
exclusion of relevant evidence when "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,11 or other problems. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, in relation to a challenge that 
photographs of the victim were unduly prejudicial, "photographs 
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that are gruesome are not inadmissible if they are probative of 
essential facts, even though they may be cumulative of other 
evidence." State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (1983). The 
"key consideration in the application of this rule," the Court 
held, was "the relevance of the photographs." Id. The court has 
held that slides of a victim1s body have "no probative value" when 
"[a]11 the iraterial facts which could conceivably have been 
adduced from viewing of the slides had been established by 
uncontradicted lay and medical testimony." State v. Poe, Utah, 
441 P.2d 512, 515 (1968). In the instant case, as in the Poe 
case, the record clearly establishes that any material fact which 
the photographs might have established had already been 
established by uncontradicted testimony; therefore, the 
photographs should not have been admitted. 
The trial court determined that the photographs were not 
cumulative and admitted the photographs of the victim for the 
reasons stated by the prosecution as evidence of the crime or the 
manner of its occurrence (P.. 1105, 1107, 1109, 1113, 1118). 
However, this information or evidence was to be or had already 
been established and was uncontradicted. Therefore, the 
photographs were merely repetitious of evidence already before the 
jury. 
Exhibit #5, a photograph of the crime scene, was offered, 
according to the prosecution, to depict the victim1s body, the 
knife, and "other things in the room" (P.. 1104). Thereafter, 
Exhibits 6, 8, 12 and 16 were introduced and admitted as evidence. 
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These exhibits were all photographs of portions of the body of the 
victim which focused on death-causing wounds of the victim. The 
latter exhibits were clearly duplicitous of Exhibit #5. The 
gruesomeness of the photographs of the victim's body riddled 
with stab wounds and gunshot wounds is undeniable/ so much so that 
it is extremely unlikely that the jury could have overcome 
feeling of passion, prejudice or hatred toward the 
defendant. This is especially true in light of the fact that all 
of the evidence portrayed in the photographs was independently 
produced by witness testimony, i.e. Bradley A. Leatham (R. 
1101-1126)/ George Pierpont (R. 1180-1219)/ Sharon I. Schnittker/ 
medical examiner (R. 1271-1282) . 
While the Court in Garcia determined that photographs may be 
admissible even though they are cumulative of other evidence, the 
cumulative effect of gruesome photographs is an essential element 
in determining whether the probative value is minimized and 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect. This Court, in the case of 
State v. Poe/ 21 Utah 2nd 113/ 441 P.2d 512 (1968) found that the 
trial court abused its discretion by admitting autopsy photographs 
of a homicide victim's dissected brain cavity to illustrate the 
path of the fatal bullets. There was no question in that case that 
the victim had died as a result of bullet wounds to the head. 
This Court held that it was reversible error to admit the 
photographs when "all the material facts which could conceivably 
have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been 
established by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony" and the 
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sole purpose for introducing the evidence was to "inflame and 
arouse the jury." 
In the case of State v. Wells, 6C3 P.2d 810 (1979) this Court 
found that photographs of a homicide victim had no essential 
evidentiary value because the evidence depicted was already before 
the jury through the testimony of the medical examiner and that 
evidence was not contested by the defendant. Therefore, the 
photographs were "superfluous" and had no evidentiary value except 
the "hoped-for emotional impact on the jury." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Montana in State 
v. Allies, 606 P.2d 1043 (1980) held that the trial court had 
committed reversible error by admitting pictures that were 
"extremely gruesome and quite capable of inflaming the minds of 
the jury." As a basis for this determination the Allies court 
held that the photograph's demonstrative purpose (including 
position of the bodies at the scene) "could have been and was 
established (by the medical examiner) without the use of the 
photographs." 
In a recent decision, this Court in State v0Cloud, 34 Utah 
Advanced Reports 39 (ttci, 1986) held that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim. 
In Cloud, the State introduced several photographs of the 
victim that showed the following: (a) the victim as she was 
discovered by the police, fully clothed, lying face down on the 
floor in a pool of coagulated blood; (b) the body after it had 
been turned over, lying face up in the pool of blood, and (c) 
12 
close-ups of three defensive wounds suffered by the victim, one in 
the arm pit and two on her hands. The State used these 
photographs to argue that, given the nature of the attack and the 
number of wounds inflicted, the defendant acted v/ith the intent 
necessary to sustain a conviction of second degree murder* This 
Court, citing the Garcia case stated, that "potentially prejudicial 
photographs are generally inappropriate and should not be admitted 
in evidence unless they have an essential evidentiary value that 
outweighs their unfairly prejudicial impact." This Court found 
that the trial court had erred in misapprehending the law as 
announced in the Garcia case. The prosecutor in the Cloud case 
did not suggest that the photographs had any "essential 
evidentiary value," as that term is explained in Garcia. Rather, 
the prosecutor argued that the photographs were admissible because 
they contained relevant evidence. The court accepted the 
prosecutor's argument and admitted the photographs. This Court 
concluded that the "photographs had no essential evidentiary 
value." This court further found that the photographs only showed 
evidence which had already been "put before the jury readily and 
accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential pre-
judice." This Court reversed the conviction of the jury and 
remanded the case for a new trial. 
The facts in the present case are almost identical to those in 
the Cloud case. In the instant case, the prosecutor introduced 
Exhibit #5, which was a picture of the victim and the crime scene 
as it appeared undisturbed. Thereafter the prosecution introduced 
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Exhibits 6, 8, 12 and 16. Exhibits 8 and 16 were c]ose-up 
pictures of the upper torso of the victim showing several stab 
wounds in the victim's back. Exhibit 12 was a close-up of the 
skull of the victim taken during the autopsy showing bullet wounds 
and bullet fragments. The prosecution did not offer the evidence 
as having any essential evidentiary value nor did he argue that it 
did. Counsel for the defendant/ on the other hand/ objected in 
each case to the admission of the aforesaid exhibits stating that 
they were duplicitousf inflammatory and very prejudicial to the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. All of H<e evidence depicted 
in the photographs was additionally admitted through the testimony 
of witnesses and was uncontradicted. Officer Bradley £. Latham 
testified about his findings at the crime scene, the location of 
the body of the victim and other pertinent facts pertaining to the 
crime scene (R. 1101-1126). Epifinao Tovar testified regarding the 
defendant's admission to him of defendant's murder of the victim. 
Mr. Tovar's testimony contained rather explicit evidence of the 
crime scene and the nature and method of the crime (R. 1127-1180). 
The State Medical Exar-inpr.- Sharer I. Schnittker testified at 
length about the wounds to the victim, their location, their 
effect, and her report was admitted as illustrative of her 
testimony (R. 1271-1282). There is no doubt the the 
photographs of the victim are extremely gruesome and very 
prejudicial, especially in light of the recent decisions of this 
Court in the Garcia, P,oe, I.'ellg c>nc C2cud cases. Due to the fact 
that any purposes the photographs might have served were sufficiently 
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established and uncontradicted, their actual purpose was only to 
incite tna jurors1 passions, disgust, hatred and vengeance, 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEPENDANT'S 
CONFESSION WAS ADMISSIBLE, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS INDUCED BY 
A PROMISE NOT TO PROSECUTE THE DEFENDANT'S GIRL FRIEND. 
The law is clear that in order for a confession to be received 
into evidence against a defendant, the confession must be voluntary. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 492 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 
2d 854 (1973). A voluntary confession is one that is freely and 
voluntarily given without coercion induced by fear or threat of 
harm and without inducement by promising or holding out hope of 
reward or benefit for the defendant or a person that he is closely 
associated with. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 543 (1967). Any 
confession which is obtained by direct or implied promise, however 
slight, is not voluntary. Bram vs. United States, 168 U.S. 352, 18 
St. Ct. 1985, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897). 
To determine whether a particular inducement is unlawful the 
court must weigh the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's confession, as well as his age, intelligence, emotional 
state, mental and physical condition of the accused. Thomas vs. 
Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 78 S.Ct. 885, 2 L.Ed 2d 863 (1958). All of 
these factors must be considered in determining whether the 
inducement offered by the law enforcement officials is sufficient 
to induce the defendant to confess because what might be 
sufficient to bring about on person's confession might be insuf-
ficient to induce anotherfs confession. 
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Certain interrogation techniques can work a subtly coercive 
effect on the defendant without overtly soliciting the defendant 
for information or without offering a direct inducement to the 
defendant for his confession. For example/ one need only examine 
the circumstances surrounding the famed "Christian burial" 
interrogation to find an instance of an indirect comment which 
caused that defendant to make an incriminating statement. Brewer 
vs. Williams/ 430 U.S. 387/ 97 S.Ct. 1232/ 51 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1977). 
The Supreme Court in Blackburn vs. Alabama/ 361 UPS* 199/ 206; 80 
S.Ct. 274/ 4 L.Ed.2d 282 (1960)/ observed: "A number of cases 
have demonstrated...that the efficiency of the rack and thumbscrew 
can be matched/ given the proper subject/ by mere sophisticated 
modes of 'persuasion.fw 
When one considers the defendant in the instant case/ his age/ 
intelligence/ mental condition and all the attendent circumstances 
surrounding the defendant's confession, one must conclude that his 
confession was involuntarily given and therefore/ inadmissible 
The defendant was interviewed for two consecutive daysf each 
interview lasting approximately five hours. When the defendant 
was arrested he was taken from the apartment of his girlfriend/ 
JoAnn Robins/ who has three small children. As the defendant 
was taken away by the police officers/ he overheard them 
saying that Ms. Robins was going to be arrested for 
harboring a fugitive (R. 315) . Later during the first 
interrogation by Sergeant Cunningham, the subject of Ms. Robins 
was raised again. Sergeant Cunningham stated that if the 
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defendant would help him, the sergeant would help JoAnn (R. 314) „ 
^he defencert understood that if he confessed to the crime under 
investigation that Ms. Robins would be released (R. 315). The 
police officer denies that he made any promises concerning Ms. 
Robins to the defendant. He does not dispute that he said Ms. 
Robins was going to go to prison for helping the defendant. Each 
time the defendant questioned the officer concerning Ms. Robins, 
the officer responded that she would be going to prison. The 
officer could tell that the defendant clearly felt some 
responsibility towards Ms. Robins and, rather than alleviate the 
defendant's concerns towards Ms. Robins, he intentionally 
heightened the defendant's anxiety and emotional state by telling 
him that she was going to prison. The defendant was already aware 
that she had been arrested; he had seen her in the jail holding 
area (R. 315). Every time the defendant asked the officer 
if she was still locked up, the officer would reply that she was 
going to prison. According to the defendant this happened five or 
six times during each interview session (R. 316). The officer 
even told the defendant that Ms. Robins' children would be placed 
in a foster home if she went to prison. The defendant knew that 
Ms. Robins was not involved and that she had been kind enough to 
take him into her apartment. He did not want the children to be 
separated from their mother. Although the officers involved in 
the interrogation deny that they made any promises concerning Ms. 
Robins or her fate, they were aware that the defendant was greatly 
concerned about her and her fate (R. 280). They used that concern 
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to psychologically pressure the defendant until he finally 
confessed. Never once did the officers make any disclaimer that 
the defendant's actions would be weighed separately from Ms. 
Robins1 involvement. They allowed the defendant to feel 
responsible for the fact that Ms. Robins would go to prison 
without even telling him that her case would be evaluated 
separately on its own merits. By not doing this, the officer 
played upon the defendant's belief that if he confessed she 
would be released. He did not have to overtly make a promise 
or an offer of an inducement: he only had to suggest the 
possibility, it is clear from the evidence that the officer 
used defendant's concern for his girl friend to obtain the 
confession. 
Where law enforcement officials have used a promise to release 
a close relative or benefit a family member/ the courts have 
routinely found that any subsequent confession is involuntary. 
People v. Melius, 134 CaJ Apr. 219, 25 p.?c 2?7 (1933); People 
v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505 (1959); 80 A.L.R. 2d 1418 (1961). In 
People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d 576, 354 P.2d 231 (1960), the 
California Supreme Court found from the uncontradicted evidence 
that the defendant's confession was involuntary when the police 
held his wife in custody away from her children. There was an 
implied threat or promise to the accused, irrespective of what 
express words might or might not have been used by the police, 
that his wife's release from custody was dependent upon his 
confessing the crime. 
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The Supreme Court has held confessions involuntary where there 
has been a threat to take the defendant's wife into custody or 
where the police have threatened to have the defendant's 
children placed in foster care. Roger v. Richmond, 355 U.S. 
534, 81 S.Ct. 785, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1961); Lynuum v. Illinois, 
372 U.S. 528, 83 St. Ct. 917, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1963). 
In Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that promising to release the 
accused's girl friend if he confessed was an inducement rendering 
the confession involuntary. It noted that a confession can 
be exacted by mental coercion and the real question is whether the 
pressure in whatever form was sufficient to overcome the 
defendant's will and his capacity for self-determination. 
Further, the Court rejected the notion that the detention of a 
live-in girl friend does not have the same legal consequences as 
the detention of a wife or relative. It pointed out that the 
determination should be based on the impact of the circumstances 
rather than the legal relationship of the parties. Ferguson v. 
Boyd, 566 F. 2d 878 (Note 7). 
The defendant's confession was given under similar 
circumstances as Boyd's and should be held to be involuntary. It, 
therefore, is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution which has been made applicable to the states. 
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POINT IV 
UTAHfS SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS STATUTE FOR CAPITAL FELONY 
CASES VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE STATUTORY AGGRA-
VATING FACTORS, WHICH ARE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE 
CAPITAL CRIME, ARE ALSO THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS CONSIDERED 
BY THE JURY IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE THE DEATH 
SENTENCE. 
In Furman vs. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, (1972) the Supreme Court 
reversed the death sentence imposed upon the defendant and held 
that the death penalty could not be imposed under sentencing 
procedures that created a substantial risk that the penalty would 
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The effect of 
that holding was to deem unconstitutional many of the capital 
punishment statutes throughout the United States. As a result, a 
majority of the states, including Utah, modified or rewrote their 
capital punishment statutes in order to comply with the 
constitutional standards required under Furman. One of the 
developments adopted by several states, including Utah, is a 
bifurcation of the trial into an initial guilt-innocence phase and 
a subsequent penalty phase. Drafters of the Model Penal Code, as 
quoted in Gregg vs. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976), concluded: 
[If a unitary proceeding is used] the determination of 
the punishment must be based on less than all the 
evidence that has a bearing on that issue, such, for 
example, as a previous criminal record of the accused, 
or evidence must be admitted on the ground that it is 
relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as 
irrelevant or prejudicial with respect to guilt or 
innocence alone. Trial lawyers understandably have 
little confidence in a solution that admits evidence 
and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should 
be considered only in determining the penalty and 
disregarded in assessing guilt. 
The obvious solution ... is to bifurcate the 
proceeding, abiding strictly by the Rules of Evidence 
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until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt 
has been determined opening the record to further 
information that is relevant to sentence. This is the 
analog of the procedure in the ordinary case when 
capital punishment is not an issue; the court conducts 
a separate inquiry before imposing sentence. 
ALI Model Penal Code, Section 201.6, Comment 5, pages 
74-75, (Tent. Draft #9, 1959). 
The purpose, then, of the bifurcated trial is to permit a 
limitation on the evidence admitted to avoid unfair prejudice to 
the defendant during the jury's determination of guilt or 
innocence. After the determination of guilt, the penalty phase of 
the trial begins. In that phase, 
[elvicence may be presented as to any matter the court 
deems relevent to sentence, including but not limited 
to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the 
defendant's character, background, history, mental 
and physical condition, and any other facts in 
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any 
evidence the court deems to have probative force may 
be received regardless of its admissibility under the 
exclusionary rules of evidence. Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-3-207(2). 
The purpose of broadening the scope of evidence to be 
considered by the jury is to permit the defendant to present 
evidence of factors which mitigate against imposition of the death 
penalty. Often this evidence would be inadmissible in the 
guilt-innocence phase of the trial because of its irrelevance in 
determining guilt. 
Another reason for bifurcation of the trial as indicated by 
the drafters of the Model Penal Cede quoted above is that the jury 
often cannot distinquish between evidence which should be 
considered only in determining the penalty and disregard it in 
assessing guilt. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are 
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limitations on a juryfs ability to disregard incriminating 
evidence against a defendant despite limiting instructions from 
the court. In Bruton vs. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1967), 
evidence of a confession by the defendant implicating his 
co-defendant was admitted. The defendant invoked his right not to 
testify and, therefore, the co-defendant could not cross-examine 
the defendant. The trial court instructed the jury to consider 
the evidence only in determining the guilt of the defendant but 
not the co-defendant. The Supreme Court said "We hold that, 
because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions 
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial 
statements in determining [co-defendant's] guilt, admission 
of [defendant's] confession in this joint trial violated 
co-defendant's right of cross-examination secured by the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment." 
Similarly, in Jackson vs> Denno, 378 U.S.368 (1963), the New 
York practice had been to submit the issue of voluntariness of a 
confession to the jury along with the determination of guilt or 
innocence. The jury was told that, if it found the confession 
involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, and determine guilt 
or innocence solely from the other evidence in the case; 
alternatively, if it found the confession voluntary, it was to 
determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight 
accordingly. The Supreme Court said that "the New York procedure 
poses substantial threats to a defendant's constitutional rights 
to have an involunatry confession entirely disregarded and to have 
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the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined. These hazards 
we cannot ignore." IcL at 389. The Supreme Court held that the 
New York procedure was a violation of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the determination of 
voluntariness of confession must be determined in an independent 
hearing to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant. 
Under Utah law, the defendant in the instant case was charged 
with first-degree murder. During the trial phase the jury was 
required to determine two issues: First/ whether criminal 
homicide had been committed in connection with one aggravating 
factor# thereby enhancing the crime to first-degree murder/ and 
second/ whether the defendant was guilty of committing the act of 
first-degree murder. The Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 states: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another under any of the following circum-
stances. ... 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was 
engaged in the commission of/ or an attempt to commit 
... aggravated burglary.•." 
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially 
heinous/ atrocious, cruel/ or exceptionally depraved 
manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physicial 
torture/ serious physical abuse, or serious bodily 
injury to the victim before death. 
(2) Murder in the first degree is a capital offense. 
In the instant case, the defendant was found guilty in a jury 
trial of first-degree murder because of the presence of the two 
enhancing or aggravating factors listed in (d) and (q) of the 
statute. 
Upon conviction of a capital felony, Utah Code Ann. Sections 
76-3-206 and 76-3-2C7 control the penalty phase of the bifurcated 
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trial* During the penalty phase, the jury has one issue before it 
— whether the defendant is sufficently culpable for his act 
warranting imposition of the death sentence. During the penalty 
phase the jury must consider the aggravating factors as compared 
to the total mitigating factors. The jury must be persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravating factors outweigh 
total mitigating factors and they must be further persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death penalty 
is justified and appropriate under the circumstances. State vs. 
Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981). 
Section 76-3-207 lists seven statutory mitigating factors 
which may be considered and refers to Utah Code Ann., Section 
76-5-202 for the list of statutory aggravating factors. These 
statutory aggravating factors are the same factors which the jury 
has already considered in finding the defendant guilty of 
first-degree murder in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. 
However, the purpose of the penalty phase is not to determine 
guilt, but rather culpablility and sentence. Because the only 
statutory aggravating factors to be considered during the penalty 
phase are those for which the defendant has already been found 
guilty, the jury is prejudiced against the defendant regarding 
those factors. 
The distinction that the jury must make between the purpose of 
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial and the penalty phase is 
too obscure and approaches the same degree of mental gymnastics as 
was required by the trial courts in Jackson vs. Denno, supra and 
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Bruton v. United States, supra. The jury enters the penalty 
phase of the trial believing beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating factors are present* This statutory scheme shifts the 
burden of proof from the State to the defendant. The defendant 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the total mitigating 
factors outweigh total aggravating factors and that, therefore, 
the death penalty is inappropriate in his case. 
The capital punishment statutes of Georgia and Florida, which 
were deemed constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, supra and Proffit 
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) do not list the elements of the 
capital crime as aggravating factors. In contrast, the Utah 
statute, Section 76-3-207, incorporates by reference Section 
76-5-202 as the only statutory aggravating factors. This 
significant difference in the Utah statute, shifts the burden of 
proof to the defendant, is highly prejudicial, and violates due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The scope of review established for reviewing alleged error in 
the penalty phase of a capital case was stated in State v. Wood, 
Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981). The Court said that "in the penalty 
phase it is our duty to determine whether the sentence of death 
resulted from error, prejudice, or arbitrariness, or was 
disproportionate.11 The shifing of the burden of proof caused by 
the mental gymnastics required of jurors by this statute causes 
great prejudice to the defendants in capital cases and produces 
arbitrary and disproportionate results in the sentencing in 
capital cases. This error is so prejudicial that it violates the 
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defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
therefore the death sentence as determined by the jury should be 
reversed in the instant case. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT IT COULD CONSIDER ANY EVIDENCE WHICH HAD 
BEEN ADMITTED IN THE GUILT PORTION OF THE TRIAL IN 
ADDITION TO THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED IN THE PENALTY PORTION. 
The trial court instructed the jury in the penalty phase, that 
the jury could consider "...all of the evidence produced either by 
the State or the defendant throughout the guilt phase or penalty 
phase at the trial." (R. 179) Utah Code Ann., Section 
76-3-207(2) outlines the evidence that may be admitted during the 
penalty phase of a capital case. This provision does not provide 
that the jury may consider evidence introduced during the guilt 
phase. 
The prosecutor relied heavily in his closing arguments in the 
penalty phase on evidence not introduced in the penalty phase. 
He referred to evidence describing the victim's body and the brutal 
nature of the murder (R. 1437-1440). Much of his argument was 
based upon evidence produced in the guilt phase of the trial. 
This procedure denies the defendant due process in that the 
defendant does not have the opportunity to object to evidence 
which may have been competent during the guilt phase, but would be 
objectionable if offered during the penalty phase. For example, 
the evidence of prior criminal activity of a defendant for which he 
had not been convicted may have had some relevance in the guilt 
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phase, but should have been excluded in the penalty phase. 
In addition to the problem of admissibilityr the more serious 
due process violation is the difficulty of determining and 
rationally reviewing the process and evidence upon which the jury 
based its determination that the death penalty was appropriate and 
that the totality of mitigating factors was outweighed by the 
totality of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The imposition of any standard of procedure or process of 
determination is constitutionally flawed if there is no effective 
means of review. It is difficult to perceive how this Court can 
make meaning of the evidence and factors upon which the jury based 
its consideration of the death penalty issues. The trial court 
did not require the jury to make any specific findings as to the 
factors or evidence they considered. Even had the juryfs 
consideration been limited to the evidence introduced at the 
penalty phase, this court would have a difficult test. However, 
the overly broad invitation of the court to consider "any and all" 
evidence introduced during the guilt and penalty phase imposes an 
impossible test upon the appellate court. In Gardner v. Florida, 
supra at 361, the United Stated Supreme Court stated: 
Since the state must administer its capital sentencing 
procedures with an even hand, it is important that the 
record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the 
considerations which motivated the death sentence in 
every case in which it is imposed. Without full 
disclosure of the basis for the death sentences, the 
Florida capital sentencing procedures would be subject 
to the defects which resulted in the holding of 
unconstitutionality in Furman v. Georgia. 
The trial court violated the defendant's right to procedural 
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due process by allowing the jury to consider matters not 
introduced in the penalty phase, since no meaningful review can be 
had of the factors upon which the jury based their decision to 
impose the death penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
The court committed prejudicial error by failing to grant a 
change of venue* In view of the unusually concentrated and 
regionally publicized nature of this case, this failure to change 
venue resulted in a panel of jurors who were more than casually 
informed of the case. 
The trial court committed error in allowing admission of 
photographs of the victim which were unduly prejudicial, 
inflammatory and not probative of essential facts. The chance 
that the jury would base its decision out of passion was 
enhanced by such evidence. The photos were not necessary to 
establish any facts, and were cumlative of the other competent 
evidence introduced. 
The trial court committed error by failing to grant 
defendant's Motion to Suppress. The defendant's confession was 
not voluntary, but was induced by police officers who led 
defendant to believe that unless he connfessed to the crime under 
investigation, an innocent girl friend and her children would 
suffer. 
Utahfs statutory scheme, in which the statutory aggravating 
factors, also elements of the capital crime, are also the 
aggravating factors considered by the jury in determining whether 
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to impose the death penalty, violates due process. The jurors 
who have convicted the defendant have already found beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating factors during the guilt phase. 
They are then instructed that they must find aggravating factors 
in the penalty phase and apply the same reasonable doubt standard. 
The jurors are already predisposed toward death because finding 
that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors be-
yond a reasonable doubt requires some mental gymnastics that are 
extremely difficult/ if not impossible, for a layperson to do. 
Reasonable minds could not have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors completely 
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the imposition of the death penalty was justified and 
appropriate under the circumstances. There was substantial 
evidence of mitigation and little evidence of aggravation, other 
than the actual commission of the crime. 
The court erred in allowing the jury to consider any evidence 
which had been admitted during the guilt phase of the trial in 
considering the penalty to be imposed. Such procedure is not 
susceptible to meaningful review, in that the reviewing court 
cannot determine the validity of the factors which were considered 
by the jury in arriving at their determination to impose the death 
sentence. It is, therefore, constitutionally infirm in that the 
death penalty may be imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory 
manner. Such procedure is further prejudicial in that there may 
be evidence introduced during the guilt phase which is competent 
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for a limited purpose, but which is not competent evidence should 
it be offered in the penalty phase. 
Respectfully submitted this f J day of September, 1986„ 
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